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Trademark owners are increasingly pursuing the protection
of their marks in cyberspace.1  Significant litigation is developing
in situations where the same word or words are owned as a federal
trademark by one party and registered by a separate party as a
domain-name.2  Another area of potential infringement online3 in-
1 See G. Andrew Barger, Cybermarks: A Proposed Hierarchical Modeling System of
Registration and Internet Architecture for Domain-names, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 623, 624
n.3 (1996) (computer novelist William Gibson is credited with coining the term cyberspace
by using it to describe a dimensionless place where machines communicate with each other
without the aid of human intervention).
2 See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189
F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
3 Online, cyberspace and the Web are frequently used to refer to the Internet. See
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-83 (E.D. Pa. 1999), for an overview of the Internet,
explanations of domain-names, online technology and the various Internet protocols, such
as HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) used for the World Wide Web.
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volves the use of another’s mark in a web page’s meta tags.4  The
Ninth Circuit considered these issues in Brookfield Communica-
tions, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.5  Although trade-
mark disputes involving domain-names were increasing when the
Ninth Circuit addressed the Brookfield case, little precedent ex-
isted regarding meta tag infringement.  This Note is organized
into four parts.  Part I sets out the requirements for trademark
infringement claims including factors to analyze infringement
claims and the standard for injunctive relief.  Part II discusses the
facts of Brookfield and the reasoning employed by the court in
resolving the issues.  Part III critiques three aspects of the Brook-
field decision and proposes solutions for future guidance.  Part IV
concludes with a survey of key points made and the practical im-
plications Brookfield has for Internet entrepreneurs.
While the decision of the domain-name infringement claim
was correct, the court’s holding condones the practice of “reverse
domain-name hijacking” to obtain previously registered domain-
names from other parties.6  In contrast, the court’s analysis of the
meta tag infringement claim was questionable and its “initial in-
terest” analogy did not consider the basic differences between off-
line and online consumers.  Finally, the relief granted to the tri-
umphant trademark owner in this cyber-dispute was broader than
necessary to address the problem. Brookfield demonstrates that
courts need to clearly understand Internet technology before cre-
ating remedies for online disputes and be cognizant of Internet
presumptions regarding domain-name use.
4 A meta tag is a piece of HTML (hypertext mark-up language) code included in the
top portion of a web page, which informs a search engine about the contents of the page.
Meta tags are included behind the page and only viewable by clicking “View Source” in
one’s web browser.
5 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
6 See Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Comments, The Limitations of Trademark Law in
Addressing Domain-name Disputes, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (1998) (explaining “reverse do-
main-name hijacking” is where a trademark owner brings suit for infringement against a
prior legitimate user of a domain-name that contains the trademark owners mark).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Basis For Trademark Infringement: The Lanham Act
1. Scope of Trademark Infringement
The Lanham Act7 definitions for trademarks8 and service
marks9 indicate a broad array of listings may serve as marks.  De-
pending on how it is used, a domain-name may be classified as a
protectable mark.  The Supreme Court has held that in consider-
ing the “universe of things that can qualify as a trademark” the
language of the Lanham Act describes this protectable “universe”
in the “broadest of terms.”10
Two methods are used to protect a mark.  First, common law
protects those who are the first to adopt and use a mark.  Such
users receive the exclusive right to use the mark in any area
where they can demonstrate a continued actual use of the mark.11
The Lanham Act codified this rule under section 33(b)(5) for good
faith users who were using a mark before a later party applied for
federal registration of the same mark.12  The second method is to
register the mark with the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”).13  Once the PTO issues a certificate of registration, the
certificate constitutes “prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark. . .and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
registered mark in commerce.”14
An infringement claim15 is normally based on a third party’s
use of a mark that is the same or confusingly similar to the claim-
7 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1999) (the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 is the gen-
eral basis used for trademark infringement causes of action).  The original Lanham Act
sections were numbered §§ 1-46 and are still commonly used in judicial opinions.  Refer-
ence to Lanham Act sections will be based on the original numbers.
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a “trademark” as
“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof- (1) used by a person . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and
to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” Id.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999). A “service mark” is defined as “any word, name, sym-
bol or device, or any combination thereof- (1) used by a person . . . to identify and distin-
guish the services of one person . . . from the services of others and to indicate the source of
the services, even if that source is unknown.” Id.
10 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (finding trademark
protection for the green-gold color of manufacturer’s dry cleaning press pads).
11 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
12 The defense may be used when a party is charged with infringement by a holder of
a valid federally registered trademark, provided the defendant was unaware of the other
party’s use of the mark, and the defendants use pre-dates the date of the federal applica-
tion for the trademark.  Such protection is only valid where continuous prior use by defen-
dant is proved.  15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1999).
13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1999) (the application must indicate the first use of the mark
in commerce and state that to the best of the applicant’s knowledge no other person has the
right to use the mark).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1999).
15 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining infringement claims may be brought under sec-
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP108.txt unknown Seq: 5 23-APR-01 17:18
2001] Internet Ambush 235
ant’s mark.  The claimant must demonstrate the third party’s use
is likely to cause confusion in the marketplace.16  The Lanham
Act’s “use” refers to “use in commerce.”17  Mere registration of a
domain-name is not “use in commerce” sufficient to meet the Lan-
ham Act’s threshold.18
2. Elements of Trademark Infringement
The general remedy for a trademark owner seeking to prevent
another from using its mark or a confusingly similar mark is an
injunction.  To receive a preliminary injunction,19 a plaintiff must
show:  (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable
injury, or (2) serious questions regarding the merits with the bal-
ance of hardships tipping in plaintiff’s favor.20  A plaintiff must
prove two elements to prevail.  First, a plaintiff must demonstrate
the validity of its mark21 and second, that the possibility exists the
public will be confused about the sponsorship of a mark and mis-
takenly associate defendant’s mark with plaintiff’s.22  This second
requirement is the “likelihood of confusion” standard.23
a) Valid Marks
The primary focus of the validity inquiry is in determining
who was first in time to use the mark in commerce.  After a mark
has been registered for over five years, it receives “incontestable”
status, meaning its validity and protectability is conclusively pre-
tion 32(1) or section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and although section 43(a) protects against a
broader range of practices besides infringement such as false advertising and product dis-
paragement, the analysis under both sections is often identical).
16 Id. at 1046 n.6; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1999) (section 43(a)(1) provides: “Any person
who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which (A) is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, ser-
vices or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” ).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1999) (defining “use” as:  “the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.  [A] mark shall
be deemed to be in use in commerce-(1) on goods when it is placed in any manner on the
goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith . . . (2) on services when it is
used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce.”).
18 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1051.
19 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-17 (1999) (Section 34 of the Lanham Act provides authority
to grant injunctive relief to protect the rights of a mark owner and section 35 permits,
subject to principles of equity, for a plaintiff to recover damages, defendants profits and
cost of the action).
20 See Sardi’s Restaurant Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 1985).
21 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1046-47.
22 Id. at 1054.
23 Id.
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sumed.24  The party who can demonstrate actual use of a mark
first is considered the “senior” user.  This user has the right to
enjoin a subsequent junior user from using a confusingly similar
mark in the same or similar market and to prevent the junior user
from competing in any area considered to be the senior user’s “nat-
ural zone of expansion.”25
One approach to resolving which party is the senior user is to
consider the date the trademark application was filed.  A benefit
of filing a trademark application is that the applicant receives a
constructive use date as of the day the application is filed with the
PTO.26  Under section 7(c) of the Lanham Act, contingent on final
approval of the mark, the filing of an application “shall constitute
constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, nation-
wide in effect . . . except for a person . . . who, prior to such filing—
(1) has used the mark.”27
Seniority may also be established where a party can show
there was enough pre-sale publicity revolving around the mark
such that a significant portion of the public had already formed an
association between the mark and the organization.28  Pre-sale use
under these circumstances has been found sufficient to qualify as
“use.”29  The “talismanic” test for pre-sale use is whether the mark
has become sufficiently public to distinguish the marked goods in
a certain segment of the public mind as being related to the
adopter of the mark.30
Words that are candidates for trademark protection are
grouped into four categories, listed from weakest to strongest: ge-
neric, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful.31  Before a
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1999) (a mark that has been in “continuous use for five con-
secutive years subsequent to the date of  [federal] registration and is still in use in com-
merce, shall be incontestable”).
25 See Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin,
Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1990); 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 16:5 (4th ed. 1999) (explaining natural zone of expansion as “[w]hen a senior
user of a mark on product line A expands later into product line B and finds an intervening
user, priority in product line B is determined by whether the expansion is ‘natural’ in that
customers would have been confused as to source or affiliations at the time of the interven-
ing user’s appearance.”).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1999).
27 Id.
28 See Marvel Comics Ltd. v. Defiant, 837 F. Supp. 546, 547-548 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (to
show pre-sale use, the plaintiff presented evidence it had sold over 13 million comic books
announcing new character, “Plasmer,” distributed a sales catalog to approximately 12,500
distributors with advertisements for the character, and showed that the character’s picture
had appeared in a trade magazine with a circulation of 20,000 readers).
29 Id.
30 See New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 1951).
31 See Public Service Co. of N.M v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 436,
438 (D. Mass. 1999).  Generic terms are ineligible for protection, descriptive terms are eligi-
ble only if secondary meaning is acquired, suggestive terms require imagination to con-
clude the source of the goods, and arbitrary or fanciful terms that are unrelated to the good,
are eligible for protection without proof of secondary meaning, id. See generally 1 MCCAR-
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descriptive mark is eligible for protection, it must have secondary
meaning, which means the public primarily associates the mark
with a certain product or service.32  While generic terms cannot be
protected, use of a descriptive mark for over five years is prima
facia evidence the mark has become distinctive and therefore
valid.33
b) Likelihood of Confusion
Brookfield used an eight-factor test, detailed in AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats,34 the “Sleekcraft” test, to determine whether a
likelihood of confusion existed.35  The Sleekcraft factors do not en-
compass an “exhaustive” list; other considerations may be rele-
vant depending on the circumstances.36  Professor McCarthy
explains although all the likelihood of confusion factors should be
considered, “[n]o mechanistic formula can set forth in advance the
variety of elements that comprise. . .the context from which likeli-
hood of confusion must be determined.”37
B. Fair Use
If a mark is “used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party,” then such use is considered non-
infringing.38  Section 43(c)(4)(A) of the Lanham Act permits “fair
use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commer-
cial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark.”39  The fair use defense
thereby permits use of a famous mark in the absence of an ade-
quate descriptive substitute.  Such use helps avoid having to ven-
ture “into absurd descriptive phrases” to convey a concept or
message.40
THY, supra note 25, § 11:01-26 (for an extensive discussion on the spectrum of words eligi-
ble for trademark protection).
32 See Bigstar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (1999).
34 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
35 Id. at 348-49. The Sleekcraft test considers: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity
of the goods; (3) evidence of actual confusion; (4) marketing channels used; (5) types of
goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendants intent
in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id.
36 See Dreamwerks Prod. Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.
1998).
37 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 23:19,54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 21, comment a (1995)).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1999).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (1999).
40 Playboy Enters, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (1998) (finding that since
no reasonable alternative existed to describe a playmate’s former status, it was fair use to
include the phrase “Playmate of the Year 1981” on defendants web pages and in her sites
meta tags).
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C. Internet Enigmas in Trademark Analysis
An ongoing challenge for the courts is to determine how the
practices and technology of the Internet interact with trademark
law.  One district court stated in Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee,41
“[t]he terms of the Lanham Act do not limit themselves in any way
which would preclude application of federal trademark law to the
Internet.”42  Professor McCarthy has pondered the question: “Is a
domain-name a trademark?”43  His answer is: “A domain-name
can become a trademark if it is used as a trademark.”44  Courts
look to the way the domain-name is used to make this determina-
tion.  One court stated, “[w]hen a domain-name is used only to in-
dicate an address on the Internet and not to identify the source of
specific goods and services, [then] the name is not functioning as a
trademark.”45
The PTO’s view is that before a domain-name is eligible for
registration as a trademark, the application must show it will be
used in a manner as to indicate source and not merely as an indi-
cator of the address to a web site.46  Some “value added” activity
must exist at a web site beyond the mere advertising of goods and
services before the site name may be eligible for registration as a
trademark.47  The inclusion of “.com” in a trademark registration
by itself is considered as having no trademark significance.48
However, if “.com” were positioned in the public’s mind as having
some type of commercial impression (e.g., “amazon.com”), then in-
cluding it in a trademark registration would make sense.49
Another trademark issue involves consideration of the use of
another’s mark in a competitor’s meta tags in an effort to increase
site visits.  Meta tags are not visible to the person viewing the web
page, but are included in the invisible background code of the web
page to help identify the contents of the page to search engines.50
Meta tags assist parties conducting searches for particular topics
to find web pages that have included such topics in their meta
41 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997).
42 Id. at 741.
43 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:17.1.
44 Id.
45 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
46 See United States Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Marks
Composed, In Whole Or In Part, Of Domain Names, Examination Guide No. 2-99 at § II-A
(visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide229.htm> (If the
proposed mark will be used as nothing more than an online business card indicating where
a person can be contacted, registration must be refused.).
47 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:17.1.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (1998).
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tags.51  The most popular meta tags are the keyword and descrip-
tion tags.52  Search engines receive information about web sites
primarily in two ways.53  The first method involves human effort
by page authors (“web masters”) who submit new sites to search
site editors that are then reviewed and categorized.54  The second
method is achieved automatically by having a web “spider” or
“robot” continually scan the Web and automatically categorize re-
sults, often putting importance on the content a page includes in
its keyword meta tags.55
Two controversial uses of meta tags online are “spamdexing”
and “competitor use”.56  Spamdexing involves using popular terms
(e.g., “George W. Bush”) as keywords that are unrelated to the
content of a page.57  Spamdexing web masters attempt to receive a
higher ranking from the results of a search by repeating terms
more frequently in the meta tags in the web page.58  However, be-
cause search engines have a crucial need to be accurate sources for
information on the Web, many search sites are enacting counter-
measures against spamdexing, including penalizing spamdexing
web sites with lower rankings or ignoring keyword meta tags en-
tirely.59  The other potential infringing use of a competitor’s trade-
mark occurs when a competitor uses another’s trademark in its
keyword meta tags on its web page.60
D. Remedies
Similar to off-line trademark infringers, Internet trademark
infringers may be required to cease use of all infringing marks
51 Id.
52 See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What’s the
Meta for?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835, 844-46 (2000).  Keyword tags are specific terms that convey
core concepts regarding the page and description tags provide a concise description of the
page. Id. at 845-46.
53 Id. at 847-48.
54 Id. at 847 (such an approach is used by Yahoo).
55 Id. at 848 (Excite, Alta Vista and Google utilize such techniques); Katherine E. Gas-
parek, Comment, Applying the Fair Use Defense in Traditional Trademark Infringement
and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Linking Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 787,
789 (1999).
56 See Lastowka, supra note 52, at 862.
57 Id. at 865; Elizabeth Weise, Some Web Pages Take Search Engines for a Ride, USA
TODAY, Sept. 29, 1997, at 4d. (describing techniques to manipulate search engines as
“spamdexing”).
58 See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search En-
gines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43 (1998) (explaining meta tags are presently
used more to spam than to inform).
59 See Lastowka, supra note 52, at 850 n.74, 867 (explaining Excite claims not to sup-
port keyword meta tags any longer).
60 Id. at 874-76 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998
U.S. Dist. WL 724000 (E.D.Va. Apr. 10, 1998), as an example of competitor use where an
adult site was enjoined from using the word “playmate” in its meta tags).
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upon order of a court.61  Sometimes a defendant is ordered to turn
over the infringing domain-name to the trademark owner.  For ex-
ample, defendants who registered “candyland.com” were required
to turn over the domain-name to Hasbro.62
E. Trademark Protection Online
Courts generally support trademark owners’ rights in the In-
ternet context.  A recurring theme in domain-name disputes is
that mere registration of a domain-name alone does not supersede
federal trademark law.63  However, a key factor in cases seeking
injunctive relief for alleged domain-name infringement is a dem-
onstration by plaintiff of a likelihood of confusion.  For example, in
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton no likelihood of confusion was
found by the defendant’s registration and use of the domain-
names “avery.net” and “dennision.net.”64  The court held plaintiff
failed to demonstrate defendant’s use of the domains for an e-mail
business would cause confusion in the marketplace.65
Only a few Internet related trademark infringement cases
were claiming meta tag infringement when Brookfield was de-
cided.66  The court utilized “initial interest confusion” to analyze
the situation.67  Initial interest confusion involves a bait and
switch tactic where a competitor lures a customer by using the
mark of a competitor.68  Although the customer is not mislead
when an actual purchase is made, some courts feel the initial in-
terest which was piqued by using the mark of a competitor is a
usurpation of the mark owner’s goodwill, thereby creating “suffi-
cient trademark injury.”69  For example, Playboy Enterprises has
been successful in enjoining the use of PLAYBOY in an unaffili-
61 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999). West Coast was prohibited from using “moviebuff.com” for its
web site domain-name and “@moviebuff.com” in conjunction with e-mail. Id.
62 See JONATHAN ROSENOER, CYBERLAW: THE LAW OF THE INTERNET 106-07 (Springer-
Verlag 1997) (discussing Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996)).
63 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066 (“[R]egistration of a domain-name for a Web site
does not trump long-established principles of trademark law.”); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v.
McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Va. 1997) (commenting on the first-come, first-serve
policy of domain-name registrar Network Solutions, Inc., (NSI), the court stated “such a
policy cannot trump federal law”).
64 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (defen-
dant sold vanity e-mail addresses to attract customers with the surname Avery or Denni-
son offering the chance to have an email address like “firstname@avery.net”).
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (1998) (holding it
was permissible for a former playmate to use the phrase “Playmate of the Year 1981” on
her web site and in the sites meta tags).
67 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
68 Id.
69 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d. 254, 257-58 (2d Cir.
1987).
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ated adult web site’s meta tags.70 The Ninth Circuit in Brookfield
remained consistent with the trend in extending trademark rights
in the Internet context.
II. BROOKFIELD COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. WEST COAST
ENTERTAINMENT CORP.
A. Factual Background
West Coast Entertainment Corporation (“West Coast”) is one
of the nation’s largest video rental chains with over 500 stores.71
West Coast began using its service mark “The Movie Buff’s Movie
Store” in 1986 for “advertisements, promotions, and letterhead in
connection with retail services featuring videocassettes and video
game cartridges.”72  Brookfield Communications, Inc. (“Brook-
field”) started business in 1987 focusing on the professional movie
industry by offering industry specific information on films, sub-
missions, industry credits, and professional contracts.73  West
Coast applied to the PTO for federal registration of its service
mark in 1989. It was approved in 1991 and became incontestable
in 1996.74 Brookfield began offering in 1993, a movie industry in-
formational database entitled “MovieBuff” to a broader consumer
base.75
On February 6, 1996, West Coast registered the domain-name
“moviebuff.com” stating it chose the name because the term
“Movie Buff” was part of its service mark.76  Sometime later in
1996, Brookfield tried to register “moviebuff.com” but found it had
already been registered to West Coast.77  Brookfield therefore reg-
istered two related domain-names “brookfieldcomm.com” and
“moviebuffonline.com” at which it offered the “MovieBuff” prod-
ucts for sale.78  One of West Coast’s initial uses of “moviebuff.com”
was in e-mail correspondence with lawyers and customers start-
ing in April 1996.79  On August 19, 1997, Brookfield applied for a
federal trademark80 and service mark81 for the term “MovieBuff.”
70 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D.
Cal. 1997).
71 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042.
72 Id. at 1043.
73 Id. at 1041.
74 Id. at 1043 n.5.
75 Id. at 1041.
76 Id. at 1042.  West Coast’s service mark covered “retail store services featuring video
cassette and video game cartridges” and “rental of video cassettes and video game car-
tridges.” Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1052-53.
80 Id. at 1042. Brookfield stated on its trademark application that the product was
“computer software providing data and information in the field of the motion picture and
television industries.” Id.
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The PTO issued federal trademark registrations for both marks on
September 29, 1998.82  August 1997 was the first date that Brook-
field began offering its “MovieBuff” software and database
online.83
Brookfield learned West Coast intended to launch a web site
at “moviebuff.com” in October 1998, which offered among other
things an entertainment database similar to the Brookfield
database.84  Brookfield thereafter delivered a cease-and-desist let-
ter to West Coast on November 10, stating West Coast’s planned
use of “moviebuff.com” would be a violation of Brookfield’s trade-
mark rights.85  The following day West Coast issued a press re-
lease announcing the coming launch of “moviebuff.com” and
describing the site as containing “movie reviews, Hollywood news
and gossip, provocative commentary, and coverage of the indepen-
dent film scene and films in production.”86  The press release also
described the entertainment database that would be available.87
Brookfield responded with a suit88 seeking to enjoin West Coast
from using the mark “MOVIEBUFF” in any manner, including as
a domain-name or in the meta tags of West Coast’s web site.89
West Coast argued, based on its prior valid service mark re-
gistration, that it was the “senior user” of the mark “MovieBuff.”90
West Coast’s federal registration of its service mark became incon-
testable in 1996 after having been registered with the PTO and in
continuous use for five consecutive years.91  West Coast offered ev-
idence it had spent over $15 million on advertisements and pro-
motions featuring the mark.92  West Coast contended that since it
used “moviebuff.com” prior to Brookfield’s offering of an online
version of its “MovieBuff” database, West Coast was the senior
user for online purposes.93  West Coast also claimed there would
be no likelihood of confusion for Lanham Act purposes as a result
of its planned online use of “moviebuff.com.”94
81 Id. Brookfield’s service mark application described its service as “providing multi-
ple-user access to an on-line network database offering data and information in the field of
the motion picture and television industries,” id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1051 n.13 (when Brookfield first began offering its “MovieBuff” software and
database online was the subject of “bitter dispute” between the parties).
84 Id. at 1042.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042-43.
88 Id. at 1043 (along with Brookfield’s Lanham Act trademark infringement claim, it
also sued for unfair competition, and trademark dilution under Lanham, as well as for
violations of California’s trademark and unfair competition laws).
89 Id. at 1043.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 1043 n.5.
93 Id. at 1043.
94 Id.
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B. Procedural History
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California denied Brookfield injunctive relief finding West Coast
the senior user of “moviebuff.com” and that no likelihood of confu-
sion existed from the planned use of the domain-name.95  Brook-
field appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for a
preliminary injunction and filed a motion for an injunction pend-
ing appeal, which was denied.96  West Coast launched
“moviebuff.com” on January 16, 1999.97  Brookfield then filed an
emergency motion for an injunction pending an appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.98  The appel-
late court granted Brookfield’s motion on February 24, 1999, and
entered an order enjoining West Coast:
[F]rom using, or facilitating the use of, in any manner, including
advertising and promotion, the mark MOVIEBUFF, or any
other term or terms likely to cause confusion therewith, includ-
ing @moviebuff.com or moviebuff.com, as the name of West
Coast’s web site service, in buried code or metatags on its home
page or web pages, or in connection with the retrieval of data or
information on other goods or services.99
Brookfield was required to post a $25,000 bond before the in-
junction would become effective.100  West Coast then filed a motion
for reconsideration and modification, asking the bond requirement
be raised to $400,000 and seeking a stay of the injunction pending
appeal.101  Both requests were denied.102
C. Internet Issues
The court recognized the case involved technical aspects of
the Internet.103  The issue was: “[w]hether federal trademark and
unfair competition laws prohibit a video rental store chain from
using an entertainment-industry provider’s trademark in the do-
main-name of its web site and in its web site’s metatags.”104  The
court began its analysis with a thorough discussion of the Internet
and relevant technology.
The court reasoned domain-names are somewhat analogous
to a telephone number or street address and are made up of two
components: a second-level domain-name and a top-level domain-
95 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1044.
103 Id. at 1043.
104 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041.
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name.105  A second-level domain-name is the original portion of the
web site address selected by the party registering the domain-
name.106  The top-level domain is the “.com” portion of the address
and is selected by the party registering the domain-name in an
effort to describe the nature of the web site.107
When the exact web address of a site is not known, an In-
ternet user may attempt to guess the domain-name by typing in
the presumed name in the “location window” of the web
browser.108  These “guesses” are often unsuccessful, frustrating,
and time consuming.  Search engines have emerged to assist a
person searching for a specific web site.109
1. Validity of Brookfield’s Mark
The first issue addressed was whether Brookfield had a valid
mark, thereby entitling it to protection.  Although Brookfield held
a registration certificate from the PTO for “MovieBuff,” West
Coast could prevail as a senior user by demonstrating its use of
the mark pre-dated Brookfield’s use.110  The court held one would
be deemed the “senior” user111 by using an inherently distinctive,
suggestive, mark first.112
In its defense, West Coast argued Brookfield’s online offering
of its database, which began in May 1996, was sufficiently dissimi-
lar to West Coast’s own web site at “moviebuff.com.”113  Therefore,
no likelihood of confusion would exist and West Coast should be
entitled to seniority.114  West Coast urged the court to distinguish
between Brookfield’s non-Internet sales of the “MovieBuff”
software, and its later web service where it offered an online ver-
sion of the database.115  The court observed Brookfield had failed
105 Id. at 1044.
106 Id.  The words that come after “www.” and before “.com” in a web site address are
the second-level domain words (www.second-level domain word.com).
107 Id.; Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). Several
top-level domains are available from NSI, depending on the entity, including: “.com” (com-
mercial), “.edu” (educational), “.org” (non-profit and miscellaneous organizations), “.gov”
(government), “.net” (networking provider), and “.mil” (military), id.
108 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044.  Web browsers have a location window, which
displays the web site Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) that is the domain-name of the
present web site being viewed (e.g., http://www.yourarehere.com).
109 Id.
110 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1046.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1046 n.9. Both parties agreed the mark was inherently distinctive, therefore
it was unnecessary for either to demonstrate secondary meaning, id.  All that was required
to receive priority with respect to rights to the mark was to be either first to use the mark
or first to obtain a federal trademark registration of the mark, id.; see discussion infra Part
III.A.2.a, regarding whether a different result would have occurred had West Coast urged
the mark was merely descriptive.
113 Id. at 1050-51.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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to produce evidence of a claimed use of the term “MovieBuff” on
the web in January 1996.116  The earliest Brookfield could have
launched a site was in May of 1996, when it acquired domain-
name registrations.117  This argument was important for West
Coast because Brookfield essentially could have been trying to
claim priority in use based on its off-line use of “MovieBuff.”  In
considering whether Brookfield may have had seniority based on
its prior off-line sales of “MovieBuff” software, the court recog-
nized a sub-issue as to whether the Web was within Brookfield’s
“natural zone of expansion.”118  The court concluded since Brook-
field’s constructive use date119 from filing for a federal trademark
was August 19, 1997, it was the senior user and the matter need
not be considered.120
West Coast also argued that because it had engaged in pre-
web site launch activity by using “moviebuff.com” in e-mail corre-
spondence with lawyers and customers, such activity should have
been characterized as sufficient to pre-date Brookfield’s use.121
The court recognized certain activity was sufficient to qualify as
pre-sale use, if enough interactions with the public existed to
make the impression the mark was associated with an organiza-
tion.  However, the court concluded limited e-mail use did not
meet such requirements.122  Both the district court and the appel-
late court agreed the February 1996, registration of the domain-
name “moviebuff.com” by West Coast was insufficient to qualify as
a first use.123  The district court found domain-name registration
combined with an “intent to use it commercially was sufficient to
convey trademark rights.”124  The court of appeals disagreed, ex-
plaining such a finding was contrary to principles of trademark
law.125  Mere preparation to use a mark does not create any right a
competitor is bound to respect.126  Therefore, the court disregarded
West Coast’s pre-launch activity and held the earliest West Coast
could have established a use of the mark was the date of its wide-
spread press release announcing the web site on November 11,
116 Id. at 1051 n.13.
117 Id.
118 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1051.
119 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (1999).  Under section 7(c) of the Lanham Act, contingent on
final approval of the mark, the filing of an application “shall constitute constructive use of
the mark, conferring a right of priority, nationwide in effect. . .except for a person . . .who,
prior to such filing—(1) has used the mark.. . .” Id .
120 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1051 n.13.
121 Id. at 1052-53.
122 Id. at 1052.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 1052 (citing Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir.
1992); Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. Corner Stone Franchises, 176 U.S.P.Q. 535, 538 (T.T.A.B.
1973)).
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1998.127  Since the press release was after Brookfield’s first use of
“MovieBuff” in conjunction with its online database, Brookfield
was found to be the senior user of “MovieBuff.”128
2. Did West Coast’s Mark Create Confusion?
The court began the “likelihood of confusion” analysis with a
1995 statement on the basic objectives of trademark law by the
Supreme Court:
[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping
and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily as-
sures a potential customer that this item—the item with this
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked
items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.  At the same
time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitat-
ing competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related re-
wards associated with a desirable product.129
The court then applied the Sleekcraft factors.130  The court
cautioned excessive rigidity of the law in the Internet context was
unrealistic and such “emerging technologies require a flexible ap-
proach.”131  Similarly other courts have recognized web jurispru-
dence requires recognition of the “highly fluid circumstances” of
the Internet when making legal pronouncements.132  Most of the
Sleekcraft factors favored Brookfield.133  However, since Brook-
field’s mark was relatively weak, the court found the “strength of
the mark” factor favored West Coast.134  The court concluded that
a likelihood of confusion was “strongly established.”135
D. Meta Tag Infringement
In discussing meta tag infringement, the court considered the
related Internet technology to explain how such an infringement
may arise.  The issue was “whether West Coast can use
‘MovieBuff’ or ‘moviebuff.com’ in the meta tags of its web site at
‘westcoastvideo.com’ or at any other domain-name other than
‘moviebuff.com’ (which [the court] determined that West Coast
127 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1053.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1053-54 (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64
(1995) (internal citations omitted)).
130 See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra
note 35 and accompanying text for a listing of the eight Sleekcraft factors.
131 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054.
132 See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (observing “that the
lightning speed development of the Internet poses challenges for the common-law adjudica-
tive process”).
133 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058-60.
134 Id. at 1058.
135 Id. at 1060.
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may not use).”136  The court initially explained that if West Coast’s
“westcoastvideo.com” site included the term “MovieBuff” in its
meta tags and one did a search for “MovieBuff,” then the search
result would likely include both West Coast’s site and Brookfield’s
site.137  When this result list was scanned to determine which site
listed most nearly matched the desired destination, the court con-
cluded there would be less confusion due to the difference in the
domain-names.138  If West Coast was including “MovieBuff” in its
meta tags, then when the user saw West Coast’s site in the search
results, she would be able to determine whether it was the desired
destination by looking at the domain-name “westcoastvideo.com”
in the result list.139  Even if the Internet user selected the West
Coast site from the list, upon reaching the site and seeing West
Coast’s name prominently displayed “it is difficult to say that a
consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached
or to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast’s web
site.140
Next, the court explained if West Coast were to use
“moviebuff.com” in its meta tags at the “www.westcoastvideo.com”
site there was potential for initial interest confusion.141  Internet
users who were looking for Brookfield’s “MovieBuff’’ products
might be taken by a search engine to “westcoastvideo.com” where
they would find a database similar enough to “MovieBuff.” They
might decide to remain even though they had realized the site is
unrelated to Brookfield.142  The court then held it would be im-
proper for West Coast to use “moviebuff.com” or “MovieBuff”143 in
its meta tags explaining:
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consum-
ers know they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brook-
field, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense
that, by using “moviebuff.com” or “MovieBuff” to divert people
looking for “MovieBuff” to its web site, West Coast improperly
benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its
mark.144
The appellate tribunal held that initial interest confusion in
trademark law was actionable in the Internet context.  The court
136 Id. at 1061.
137 Id. at 1062.
138 Id.
139 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.; see discussion infra Part III.B.1.c, noting the court’s inconsistent analysis of
meta tag infringement where it initially finds little confusion would result if West Coast
were to use “MovieBuff” in its meta tags, and then contradicts itself by later stating, initial
interest confusion would result by use of “MovieBuff” in its meta tags.
144 Id.
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analogized using another’s trademark in a meta tag on the In-
ternet to a person driving their car in search of a video store:
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”)
puts up a billboard on a highway reading—“West Coast Video:
2 miles ahead at Exit 7”—where West Coast is really located at
Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7.  Customers looking
for West Coast’s store will pull off at Exit 7 and drive around
looking for it.  Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the
Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may sim-
ply rent there.  Even consumers who prefer West Coast may
find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West
Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there.  Customers are
not confused in the narrow sense:  they are fully aware that they
are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to be-
lieve that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored by,
West Coast.145
The opinion also relied on cases involving Playboy Enter-
prises.  The Ninth Circuit agreed an adult web site’s use of the
Playboy mark in its meta tags constitutes infringement.146  The
court held the Lanham Act barred West Coast “from including in
its meta tags any term confusingly similar with Brookfield’s
mark” by following cases, which have “addressed trademark in-
fringement through meta tags use.”147
The contrary approach does not recognize the initial interest
doctrine.  Essentially, the use is permissible because the confusion
is harmless.  This view holds such brief confusion, or confusion
that does not affect the ultimate decision of a purchaser, is not
cognizable under trademark laws.148  The court rejected West
Coast’s argument that it should have a fair use right to the term
“MovieBuff” in its meta tags, explaining the term was unique and
not found in the dictionary.149  However, the court stated West
Coast could use the descriptive term for a movie enthusiast, e.g., a
“movie buff,” as it pleased.150  It could also use “MovieBuff” in a
comparative context.  Thus, West Coast could display an adver-
tisement banner or text on its web page that read: “Why pay for
MovieBuff when you can get the same thing here for FREE?”151
145 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
146 Id. at 1064-65 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-
734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. WL 724000, at *3, * 6-*7 (E.D. Va. Apr.10, 1998); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
147 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065.
148 See Astra Pharm. Prods. Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206-08
(1st Cir. 1983); Teletech Customer Care Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F.
Supp. 1407, 1410, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997); BigStar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207-210 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
149 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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However, West Coast’s use of “MovieBuff” to reference its own
product, the domain-name, and to attract people to its web site via
the meta tags did not constitute fair use.152
E. Holding
The court concluded preliminary injunctive relief was appro-
priate to protect Brookfield’s interest in the mark.  It also ex-
plained its conclusion supported the “public interest” in
trademarks.153  The court stated:
When a firm uses a competitor’s trademark in the domain-name
of its web site, users are likely to be confused as to its source or
sponsorship.  Similarly, using a competitor’s trademark in the
metatags of such web site is likely to cause what we have de-
scribed as initial interest confusion.  These forms of confusion
are exactly what the trademark laws are designed to prevent.154
The district court’s decision was reversed since Brookfield had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for trademark
infringement.155
III. ANALYSIS OF BROOKFIELD
A. Implicit Approval of Reverse Domain-name Hijacking
Brookfield clearly established the principle that Internet
practices are not to be displaced by fundamental trademark prin-
ciples.156  On the contrary, federal trademark principles govern In-
ternet domain-name disputes.  Although the result reached as to
the domain-name dispute was correct, some of the stated reasons
for the result are inconsistent with the court’s reasoning, and
some of the presumptions regarding the Internet are inaccurate.
This Note considers whether the court’s strong support for trade-
mark owners may be construed as tacit approval of reverse do-
main-name hijacking.
The domain-name “moviebuff.com” was valuable to both West
Coast and Brookfield.  The court stated: “Both companies, appar-
ently recognizing the rapidly growing importance of Web com-
merce, are maneuvering to attract customers via the Web.”157
Because an easy to remember domain-name, like “moviebuff.com,”
would help both companies attract customers, both had legitimate
reasons to use it.  Realizing West Coast had ownership of the do-
main-name in 1996, Brookfield effectively barred West Coast from
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
157 Id. at 1057.
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using it by obtaining federal trademark registration of the mark
“MovieBuff.”
1. Reverse Domain-name Hijacking
Reverse domain-name hijacking occurs when a trademark
owner with a valid federal trademark registration sues a web site
operator who is using the mark in its domain-name.158  West Coast
could be characterized as a victim of reverse domain-name hi-
jacking.  West Coast obtained the domain-name “moviebuff.com”
in February 1996.159  When West Coast obtained the domain-
name, it had every reason to believe it had a right to use it.  No
evidence was produced to show West Coast was on actual notice of
Brookfield’s use of “MovieBuff” when West Coast selected
“moviebuff.com” as its domain-name.160  In fact, Brookfield failed
to “come forth with substantial evidence establishing the wide-
spread recognition of its mark.”161  Therefore, West Coast could be
considered an innocent infringer because at the time it adopted
the mark it had no knowledge of Brookfield’s rights.  After regis-
tering the domain-name, West Coast began development and pro-
motion of the web site and invested substantial sums in launching
“moviebuff.com.”162
Brookfield discovered West Coast had already taken the do-
main-name, when it attempted to register “moviebuff.com” in
1996. Brookfield could have then contacted West Coast regarding
the domain-name before West Coast invested substantial funds in
developing its site.  The court observed the whole dispute might
have been more effectively handled had Brookfield acted in a more
“prompt” manner.163  Instead of contacting West Coast, Brookfield
sought a federal trademark registration for “MovieBuff.”  This act
was the first step in blocking West Coast’s efforts to use
“moviebuff.com.”  Brookfield could bring suit against West Coast
for infringement once it obtained ownership of a trademark regis-
tration for “MovieBuff.”
Entities like Brookfield would prefer litigating such a dispute
based on trademark infringement rather than resolving it through
Internet domain-name dispute policies, which would likely fail to
provide Brookfield with relief.  Such an approach would be prefer-
158 See Swartz, supra note 6, for an extensive discussion of reverse domain-name
hijacking.
159 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1051.
160 Id. at 1059.  The court pointed out Brookfield had failed to establish West Coast
knew of Brookfield’s rights in “MovieBuff.” Id.
161 Id. at 1058.
162 Id. at 1059.  West Coast explained it had “invested considerable sums in developing
its ‘moviebuff.com’ web site by the time Brookfield informed it of its rights in the trade-
mark.” Id.
163 Id. at 1061.
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able because West Coast had apparently not registered the do-
main-name in bad faith and had legitimate reasons for selecting
the domain-name.164  Applying a traditional trademark infringe-
ment analysis, Brookfield had a better chance of prevailing in the
courts since West Coast’s intent to infringe would be merely one
factor to consider, whereas with the online policies it is a require-
ment. Furthermore, the online domain-name dispute polices pro-
vide that litigating a dispute in a court of competent jurisdiction is
an acceptable alternative method for dealing with domain-name
disputes, the result of which the domain-name registrar will re-
spect.165  Once given an order from a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, NSI could then cancel, transfer or otherwise modify West
Coast’s use of “moviebuff.com” in accordance with the court or-
der.166  In this regard, Brookfield has successfully prevented West
Coast from using its domain.167
Although West Coast was not found to have sufficiently used
“moviebuff.com” for Lanham Act purposes until November 1998,168
it was unaware of the potential suit looming before it.  West Coast
was on the verge of becoming the unknowing victim of reverse do-
main-name hijacking.  Brookfield waited until it received its ap-
proved trademark application from the PTO before sending a
cease-and-desist letter to West Coast, which was over two and a
half years after becoming aware that West Coast had registered
“moviebuff.com.”169  The court effectively condoned Brookfield’s
shrewd business tactics because, although the court briefly men-
164 See Network Solutions, Inc., Network Solutions’ Domain-name Dispute Policy (vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/legal/dispute-policy.html>; In-
ternet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (visited Feb. 21, 2001) <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-
24oct99.htm>.  Pursuant to Internet domain-name dispute policies, a holder of a valid
trademark registration can make a claim against a domain-name holder only where: the
domain-name is confusingly similar to the trademark, the registrant has no legitimate in-
terest in the domain-name and the domain-name had been registered in bad faith, id. at ¶
4(a).  Network Solutions, Inc.’s latest domain-name dispute policy is the same as the  Uni-
form Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) drafted by the Internet Corpora-
tion for assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) because ICANN requires all domain-
name registrars us to it.
165 See Network Solutions, Inc., Network Solutions’ Domain-name Dispute Policy (vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/legal/dispute-policy.html> at ¶
4(k).
166 Id. at ¶ 3(b).
167 Even though NSI and ICANN have made efforts to draft fair domain-name dispute
polices, because the polices logically must provide redress to the courts as an alternative
method of resolving disputes, the possibility for reverse domain-name hijacking still exists
where Brookfield-type circumstances occur.
168 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)
169 Id. at 1042.  Brookfield first contacted West Coast via its cease-and-desist letter on
November 11, 1998. Id.  However, Brookfield was aware that West Coast had registered
“moviebuff.com” sometime before May 1996 (the opinion explains that after learning of
West Coast’s prior registration of the domain, Brookfield subsequently registered “brook-
fieldcomm.com” in May 1996). Id.  Therefore, Brookfield must have been on notice West
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tions Brookfield allowed two years to pass before it took action,170
the court gave the complete relief requested.171
One consequence of the Brookfield decision is that trademark
registration may become a prerequisite to successful domain-
name registration or to maintain rights in a domain-name of a
web site currently operating.  Furthermore, Brookfield demon-
strates innocent infringers, like West Coast, may fall victim to re-
verse domain-name hijacking before the site is launched.  One
commentator explained, due to the threat of reverse domain-name
hijacking, Internet entrepreneurs should trademark their do-
main-name with the PTO before spending development dollars on
a web site.172
Seeking trademark registration of domain-names prior to
launching the site involves filling an “Intent To Use” (ITU) appli-
cation with the PTO.173  Filing the ITU application amounts to
constructive use of the mark with full trademark protection being
awarded when the applicant provides a statement to the PTO that
the mark has been used in commerce.174  However, since it costs
between $25-$50 to register a domain-name175 and trademark
searches can range between $700 to $1000,176 this cost differential
may pose additional expenses previously considered unnecessary.
In addition, one commentator has noted the trademark search
process became more complex in the 1990’s as users invented new
frontiers for trademark law while applications for new marks in-
creased.177  Therefore, if Brookfield is construed to mean the PTO
may be used to reverse domain-name hijack a web site to obtain
its domain-name, then many current sites and those under devel-
Coast had intentions of launching a site at “moviebuff.com” but waited over two and a half
years to contact West Coast.
170 Id. at 1061.
171 Id. at 1043-44.
172 See ANDREW R. BASILE, JR., Rights to Domain-names, in ONLINE LAW 236 (Thomas
F. Smedinghoff et al. eds., 1996).
173 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1999). Intent to Use Applications under the Lanham Act
permit “[a] person who has a bona fide intention. . .to use a trademark in commerce [to]
request registration of its trademark. . .by paying the prescribed fee and filing in the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office an application. . ..” Id.
174 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 19:12-13.  Upon a showing of “good cause” an ITU
applicant may defer presenting its statement of actual use of the mark to the PTO for up to
three years, id.
175 See Network Solutions, Inc., Web Address Registration (visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://
www.networksolutions.com/en_US/catalog/domainname/> (NSI’s registrations prices are
as follows: $25 for “.org”, $30 for “.net”, $35 for “.com” and $50 for “.tv”).
176 See Trademark Edge, Trademark Search Services (visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://
www.trademarkedge.com/search/services.htm>. Trademark search costs vary considerably
ranging from $700 to $1000 with costs increasing dramatically for international searching,
id.
177 See Glenn A. Gunderson, Expansion of Trademark Law Yields Trickier Search, 21
NAT’L. L.J., May 31, 1999, at C9.  Trademark search firms are finding it harder to maintain
the reliability of the search process, id.  Trademark applications “almost doubled” from
about 112,000 filings in 1990 to 200,000 in 1998, id.
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opment could be subject to litigation.  A domain-name will be
harder in the future to retain unless one can demonstrate use that
is sufficient for Lanham Act purposes or obtain a federal trade-
mark for the domain-name.178
2. Advertising Principles and Domain-names
Basic advertising principles apply in selecting a domain-
name.179  A domain-name should be catchy, short, and easy to re-
member.180  However, unlike traditional trademark law, only one
entity can use a domain-name.181  The scarcity of domain-names is
further impacted by the reality that the only “top-level” domain
that has any significance in the publics’ mind is the “.com” exten-
sion.182  Although the “.com” domain is primarily for commercial
entities, it is also a “catch-all” domain.183  The significance of
“.com” domains is also evidenced by the fact “cyber pirates,” who
register domain-names in an effort to ransom them back to the
trademark owner, generally only select “.com” domains.184  The
coveted “.com” ending, which the majority of firms seek, results in
firms obtaining this domain at great cost and effort; therefore or-
ganizations focus on “.com” domains when attempting to register
domain-names.185  However, only a finite number of desirable do-
main-names are available.  As more entities engage the Web, se-
178 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining use in commerce for Lanham Act purposes means
the mark is used in conjunction with “actual sale of goods or services”).
179 See Barger, supra, note 1, at 624. Typically companies prefer short “footprint” ad-
vertising names to meet the long-term demands of advertising and marketing and provide
consumers with a name that is easy to remember and identify, id.
180 Id. at 625. As pointed out by Montaigne, “it is advantageous to have a handsome
name and one that is easy to pronounce and retain, for thereby kings and queens recognize
us more easily and are less apt to forget us,” id.
181 See OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“a particular domain-name can only identify one web site”).
182 See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044.  Examples of typical domain-name guessing
procedures presented by the court only use “.com,” (“Web users often assume. . .the domain-
name [will end with] ‘.com.’”) id. at 1045;  “Web users often assume, as a rule of thumb,
that the domain-name of a particular company will be the company name followed by
‘.com,’” id.; Panavision Int’l, L.P.  v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The
domain-name often consists of . . . a company’s name or trademark.  For example . . .
Pepsi.com.”).
183 See Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1318.
184 Id. at 1318-19 (describing a “cyber pirate” who attempted to sell many famous
trademark domain-names to trademark owners such as: panavision.com to Panavision for
$13,000, intermatic.com to Intermatic, Inc., for $10,000, and americanstandard.com to
American Standard, Inc., for $15,000). See also Barger, supra, note 1, at 631 (noting parties
other than the trademark owner had registered all of the following trademarks as domain-
names: mtv.com, hertz.com, esquire.com, fox.com, coke.com, abc.com, nasdaq.com, mci.com
and mcdonalds.com).
185 See Gunderson, supra, note 177, at C9 (discussing the “rapid transformation of the
‘.com’ domain from technological curiosity to commercial necessity”).
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curing a “.com” domain will be more difficult.186  One court
explains that because a domain-name, like a mailing address,
identifies only one location, the entity that owns “an intuitive do-
main-name owns a potentially valuable asset.”187  The owner of
the intuitive domain has the likely benefit that users will more
easily find its web site instead of one of its competitor’s since users
can more accurately guess the site address.188
Furthermore, the practice of omitting spaces between words
and squeezing the phrase together to aid in branding the web site
has become commonplace.189  In domain-name registration and do-
main-name guessing, the practice of “space omission” in relation
to multi-term phrases prevails.  Any multi-term buzz word or
phrase that relates to an entity off-line, when pursued online will
be pursued initially without the spaces.190  Because of this space
omission custom, companies intentionally prefer registering
multi-term off-line phrases as single term domains without hy-
phens or underscores.  Similarly, the use of a dash or underscore
in a multi-term phrase is an undesired alternative for the Johnny-
come-lately domain registrant.  The domain-name guessing scena-
rios contemplated by courts in cyber disputes do not indicate In-
ternet users would attempt to guess a domain-name with dashes
or underscores.191
In light of the space omission custom, West Coast’s decision to
register “moviebuff.com” instead of “movie-buff.com” (with a dash)
or “movie_buff.com” (with an underscore) was perfectly logical and
legitimate in light of the level of domain-name knowledge the gen-
eral public possesses.  West Coast’s decision to take the salient
portion of its service mark192 “Movie Buff,” and register it as
186 See Barger, supra, note 1, at 654-56. Although a finite number of domain-names are
available an estimated 5,200 domain-names are registered every month, id.
187 OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (“thebuffalonews.com” for “The Buffalo News”,
“planned parenthood.com” for Planned Parenthood) (citation omitted).  Other examples in-
clude the major record label, Capitol Records’ flagship web site “hollywoodandvine.com”
(after the corner where the Capitol Tower is located), americanstandard.com,
whitehouse.com, moviebuffonline.com, brookfieldcomm.com, inhollywood.com and
westcoastvideo.com.
190 See Bigstar Entertainment, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (web site addresses are “characterized by the style of uniformly lower case
lettering and compressed wording”).
191 See, e.g., OBH, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (web users looking for “The Buffalo News” web
site may attempt to enter “thebaffalonews.com”); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West
Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (web users looking for
Kraft Foods, Inc. might try “kraftfoods.com,” users looking for USA Today might try
“usatoday.com”).
192 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1042. West Coast provided examples of ads where the
key term “Movie Buff” was included in each ad: “The Movie Buff’s Gift Guide”, “The Movie
Buff’s Gift Store”, “Calling All Movie Buffs!”, “Good News Movie Buffs!”, “Movie Buffs,
Show Your Stuff!”, “the Perfect Stocking Stuffer for the Movie Buff!”, “A Movie Buff’s Top
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“moviebuff.com” in an effort to acquire an intuitive domain, fol-
lows basic advertising principles.  Had the court recognized that
space omission is the general rule, not the exception with regards
to domain-names, it may have decided the case differently.  West
Coast’s selection of the domain-name most likely was not intended
to be a trademark but as an easy to remember “cyber calling-
card.”193
a) Space Wars and Descriptive Domains
Due to the Internet practice of omitting spaces in domains
that include multiple terms, a party’s mark, which is viewed as
unique and protectable off-line, may be less unique and considered
merely a descriptive term in the online context.  Although both
parties in Brookfield agreed the term “MovieBuff” should be clas-
sified as suggestive within the spectrum of trademark terms sub-
ject to protection,194 the boundary line between descriptive and
suggestive marks has been considered “illusory” and “chimeri-
cal.”195  A company that takes two plain words and combines them
together to create a descriptive phrase, which directly relates to
the company’s industry or product, “does not, ipso facto, create an
inherently distinctive mark.”196  Brookfield’s selection of the plain
words “movie” and “buff” and then combining them together to
create a trademark, which related to a software database on the
film industry, required little imagination.  Brookfield’s mark is
one that arguably sits on the illusory border between descriptive
and suggestive marks, and, therefore, the “probability of duplica-
tion of words not particularly unique such as [’movie buff’] in en-
tertainment is high.”197
Brookfield would permit West Coast the right to use “appro-
priate descriptive term[s] in its metatags.  However, ‘MovieBuff’ is
not such a descriptive term.”198  The court explained “[e]ven
though [’MovieBuff’] differs from “Movie Buff” by only a single
Ten”, “The Movie Buff Discovery Program”, “Movie Buff Picks”, “Movie Buff Series”, “Movie
Buff Selection Program”, and “Movie Buff Film Series.” Id.
193 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 25, § 7:17.1 (domain-names, like street addresses, per-
mit one to locate a place or a person, do not, without more, function as trademarks).
194 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1047 n.9.  Had West Coast disagreed with Brookfield
that “MovieBuff” was a suggestive term, and instead argued it was merely descriptive, the
court may have reached a different result.
195 Bigstar, 105 F. Supp. at 198.
196 Id. at 199-200 (explaining no “thought gymnastics” are required to span the gap
between plaintiff’s entertainment products it sold and its mark “BIGSTAR,” which plaintiff
argued was a suggestive mark).
197 Id. at 201 (noting the use of “big star” or some close adaptation of the words in the
entertainment industry  “increases the element of predictability of some good faith recur-
rence or resemblance of the name, and diminishes the first user’s reasonable expectation of
exclusivity and the likelihood of surprise.”).
198 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
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space, that difference is pivotal.”199  However, the difference is not
pivotal in cyberspace as a result of space omission.200  West Coast
registered the salient portion of its well-known service mark, a
two-term phrase “movie buff” as “moviebuff.com.”  One benefit of
this domain-name is that it is descriptive and indicates that the
web site may be related to the motion picture industry.  Once
West Coast had registered “moviebuff.com,” it was perfectly logi-
cal for it to include the term in its meta tags since web users
searching for West Coast’s Movie Buff web site would initially
guess the domain with the spaces omitted.  Off-line, although
spelling “MovieBuff” without the space is uncommon, it is still de-
scriptive of the motion picture industry.  However, online, in the
language of the World Wide Web and domain-name traditions,
Movie Buff and “MovieBuff” would both be initially spelled as
“moviebuff.com.”
The court in Brookfield stated: “The term ‘Movie Buff’ is a de-
scriptive term, which is routinely used in the English language to
describe a movie devotee. ‘MovieBuff’ is not.”201  However, since
most multi-term phrases for domains are squeezed together, the
meaning of the term “Movie Buff” in the English language has the
same meaning in the language of the World Wide Web when it is
spelled as “moviebuff.com.” Therefore, due to space omissions
practices in domain-names, the use of plain words in a domain,
which are combined, should be considered merely a descriptive
term, entitled to no trademark protection without secondary
meaning.202  The PTO’s present policy regarding registration of do-
main-names as marks explains where a mark is composed of
merely descriptive terms combined with “.com” (or any other top
level domain extension) registration should be refused because
such is merely a descriptive mark.203  Where secondary meaning
has not been established, a descriptive multi-term domain most
likely will belong to the party who registers it.  The e-commerce
sites dedicated to trading in, auctioning off, and providing broker-
age services for domains made up of every type of conceivable de-
199 Id. (emphasis added).
200 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practice of
space omission online.
201 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
202 See Bigstar, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (secondary meaning for a descriptive mark oc-
curs where the public primarily associates the term with a certain source).
203 See United States Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Marks
Composed, In Whole Or In Part, Of Domain Names, Examination Guide No. 2-99 at § IV
(visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide229.htm>. The
PTO explains by way of example, if  the mark were “NATIONAL BOOK OUTLET.COM”
for a trademark for a retail book store service, then registration should be denied, id.  It is
interesting to note, the PTO’s example does not compress the descriptive terms, nor use
underscores, nor hyphens, most likely implying regardless of which approach is used to
combine the terms, it would still be considered descriptive.
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scriptive phrase suggest evidence of this approach.204  Clients of
domain-name auction sites are entities interested in obtaining a
catchy domain-name that in some way directly relates to and will
aid visitors in associating the domain-name with the product or
service the entity sells, e.g., “bigstar.com” would be attractive to
entertainment related entities and “moviebuff.com” could be use-
ful for any film and video industry related entity.  In Brookfield-
type situations, where secondary meaning has arguably not been
show, the first party to register a multi-term phrase as a domain
should prevail.205
b) Concurrent Primary Users
In considering reverse domain-name hijacking, one commen-
tator classified two types of parties who are victims of the practice.
“Concurrent users” are users of the same mark but for different
products and services.206  The other group are individuals, “inno-
cent registrants,” who registered the domain-name because it had
a special meaning to them personally.207  Both types register their
domains “without any improper motive.”208  This Note proposes a
third category to recognize: “concurrent primary users.”  A “con-
current primary user” would be an entity which: (1) could point to
a legitimate good faith reason for selection of the phrase; (2) was
not involved in competition or only in indirect competition with
the reverse domain hijacker or unaware of the hijackers existence;
and (3) established its web service prior to the reverse domain hi-
jacker’s date of filing for a federal trademark.209  West Coast satis-
204 Examples of domain brokerage sites include: www.domainbook.com,
www.afternic.com, www.greatdomains.com, www.domains.com and www.buydomains.com.
205 The Ninth Circuit found Brookfield’s mark a suggestive mark but the reasoning is
less than convincing: “Brookfield’s trademark is not descriptive because it does not describe
either the software product or its purpose.  Instead, it is suggestive—and thus strong
enough to warrant trademark protection—because it requires a mental leap from the mark
to the product.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058 (emphasis added).  However, a film industry
database potentially does target consumers who could reasonably be described as motion
picture enthusiasts (e.g., movie buffs).  Therefore, little imaginative energy is required to
make the mental leap from the terms meaning (a person knowledgeable about the film
industry)  to the source product (a film database) and its purpose (to assist one in acquiring
more knowledge about the film industry).  A movie buff, like a sports buff or car buff seeks
materials, which will further enhance her understanding.  A movie buff utilizing Brook-
field’s MovieBuff database  would “not come away with an impression about [Brookfield’s]
mark[ ] other than that [it] immediately describe[s] [a] product [dealing with] the motion
picture industry.” Bigstar, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 200.  Hence, because Brookfield’s mark was
weak and no secondary meaning was shown, it should have been considered descriptive
and unprotected.
206 See Swartz, supra note 6, at 1495.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Although this note’s focus is on the domain-name dispute area, no reason exists to
limit the analysis of good faith concurrent primary users to domain-name disputes.  Such
an approach may be useful in other areas of trademark law such as disputes between two
parties as to who has rights to a “1-800” number.  For example, if a national herpetologists
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fied the first two criteria but had not established its site prior to
Brookfield’s federal application date.210
The reason for the need to recognize this third category is be-
cause the Brookfield decision may encourage an organization to
engage in reverse domain-name hijacking.  Such practices are bad
for the Internet and the general marketplace.211  Discouraging the
practice of reverse domain-name hijacking is a key objective for
Internet organizations such as ICANN and WIPO.212 Brookfield
eliminates the popular belief that once a domain-name is success-
fully registered; it is yours, regardless of when the site is actually
club called the “Vipers” had registered “1-800-Go-Viper” long before Dodge unveiled its new
sports car the Viper, should Dodge be able to bring a suit to prevent such a use?  If the
Viper club can demonstrate a legitimate reason for selecting the number such as making it
easier for members to contact the club, the Viper club is not in competition with Dodge, and
the Viper club had the number prior to Dodge’s date of filing for a federal trademark, then
it would be an injustice to prevent the Viper club from continuing its use of  “1-800-Go-
Viper.”  Granting Dodge the rights to such a vast number of uses for its federal registration
of the mark, even uses that are already underway by other parties for good faith reasons,
would be giving trademark owners too much power and introducing a  new level of uncer-
tainty into the market with unclear consequences.  However, the argument for and applica-
tion of the concurrent primary user analysis, by no means should be interpreted as
discouraging federal trademark registration.  The rational for recognition of concurrent pri-
mary users is merely for a limited class of good faith parties who satisfy certain elements
that qualify them for protection from “reverse domain-name hijacking” type situations.
210 An “established” web site should mean something sufficiently more than placing a
page online that is nothing more than a “reserved” mark.
211 A strong public policy encourages trademark registration. It centralizes manage-
ment and control of marks and is a good system for attempting to avoid duplication and
minimize confusion that would result in consumers being unclear as to which mark identi-
fied which goods and what level of quality could be expected.  However, there are also pol-
icy reasons to protect individuals other than corporate America, who have long before set
up shop so to speak, and established recognition in their geographic area of their good or
service associated with a mark, but failed to take the additional step of registering with the
PTO.  Section 33(b)(5) of the Lanham Act recognized this interest by protecting the first
party to adopt and use a mark in a particular geographical area. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5)
(1999).  Because there are other mechanisms at work, which centralize and control the
issuing of domain-names and “1-800” numbers, such as domain registrars and telephone
companies, by requiring all parties which engage these other mechanisms with the addi-
tional requirement of having to obtain a federal trademark before they can safely put the
domain or “1-800” number to use is too burdensome and such a view is lopsided in favor of
large entities which can afford federal trademark registrations for every concept, product
and service developed.  It is unfair to require the astronomy club that wants to register the
domain-name ‘saturn.com’ to first obtain PTO registration. See, e.g., Mike France, The Net:
How To Head Off Big-Time Regulation, BUSINESS WEEK, May 10, 1999, available in 1999
WL 8227313. The author ponders: “If an astronomy club or New Age religions sect is first to
register ‘Saturn.com,’ . . .why should the car company later be able to boot it off?” Id.
212 See David McGuire, ICANN Board Passes Dispute Resolution, NEWSBYTES, August
26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 20019222.  The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) is a not-for-profit firm supported by the US Commerce Department
seeking to create competition into the domain-name registration process, id.  Minimizing
reverse domain-name hijacking is a one of  ICANN’s primary concerns, id. They are seek-
ing to establish rules “sensitive to the rights of individual domain-name holders,” id.;
France, supra note 211, at WL 8227313 (explaining the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO), an arm of the U.N., is working on resolving domain-name issues in light of
reverse domain-name hijacking).
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP108.txt unknown Seq: 29 23-APR-01 17:18
2001] Internet Ambush 259
launched.213 Brookfield instructs organizations desiring domain-
names already registered to others, that the domain may never-
theless still be obtainable if the organization is willing to engage
in selling a product under the same name or registering a trade-
mark under the same name.214  Since the Web is fast becoming a
“natural zone of expansion” for all, Brookfield is a green light for
major corporations to lay claims to domain-names previously reg-
istered to other parties.  Entities with significant financial re-
sources may now obtain federal trademark registration of a
domain-name registered to another and then threaten the other
party into yielding the domain-name or be faced with an expen-
sive lawsuit.  Trademark owners will claim that since the Web
was within the organizations “natural zone of expansion,” the
prior domain-registrant is an infringer and must forfeit the do-
main or cease use of it.215
c) Repeat Visitors
West Coast’s offering of a consumer targeted film industry
database was a way to attract customers to the site.  The more
“traffic” a site has, the better it looks to potential banner advertis-
ers and investors.216  West Coast offered the database free as a fur-
ther enticement.217  In addition, to West Coast’s desire to use
“moviebuff.com” because it was the salient part of its service
mark, the domain-name was appealing because it helped remind
visitors the site offered movie information and trivia.  It was logi-
cal to name the web site “moviebuff.com” since it catered to film
enthusiasts.  Although the court recognized West Coast may use
the term “Movie Buff” if it desired,218 West Coast had a better
chance of getting visitors to both remember the site and return if
213 See Andrew S. Mansfield and James P. Jenal, ‘Brookfield’ Sets Standards on Do-
main-name Rights, NAT’L L.J., May 31, 1999, at C3.  The authors point out, the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s requirements for protecting domain-names though well reasoned are “contrary to the
practice of many domain-name holders, who often register, purchase and hold domain-
names for years before using them ‘in commerce,’” id.
214 Id. Where a company fails to use a domain-name, Brookfield indicates another can
do an “end-run around” the company to obtain rights to the name by marketing software or
Internet services with the same name, id.
215 Exploring whether the “natural zone of expansion” doctrine should not apply for
infringement cases involving the Internet would be a worthy research project but is beyond
the scope of this note.
216 See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Hoffman Testi-
mony). The level of web “traffic” at a site is a critical factor evaluated by Internet investors.
Id.
217 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
218 Id. at 1066.
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP108.txt unknown Seq: 30 23-APR-01 17:18
260 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:231
it could use “moviebuff.com” instead of, or in addition to,
“movie_buff.com” or “movie-buff.com.”219
The Brookfield holding is good news for large corporations
who have been trying to establish a rule that they are entitled to
any domain-names using their trademarks—“no matter who gets
there first.”220  WIPO has been holding deliberations in an attempt
to resolve some of the problems with domain-name disputes.  The
solutions however, are lopsided in favor of the multinational cor-
porations who can afford to attend the public hearings in such lo-
cations as Brussels and Sydney.221
3. Solutions
If the three conditions for status as a “concurrent primary
user” are met,222 then a trademark owner should be unable to use
its recently approved federal trademark registration as a tool to
hijack the prior domain-name registration.  When faced with a do-
main-name dispute, a court may use the Brookfield approach to
determine who is the senior user and whether likelihood of confu-
sion exists.  However, where a defendant appears to be a “concur-
rent primary user,” then the plaintiff should be prohibited from
using the federal trademark registration as a means to prevent
the defendant’s use of the domain-name.223  The basic rule of first
in time should apply to such situations.
Where concurrent use is at issue, mere registration of the do-
main should be sufficient to grant priority of online use.  If two
concurrent users, both with legitimate off-line rights to use a
mark, engage the Internet, it is reasonable to award the first
party to register the mark as a domain with the rights to use it.
For example, “delta.com” does not belong to Delta Airlines or
Delta Faucets but to Delta Financial Corporation.224
219 Although the court did not address the issue, it appears the Brookfield result would
have been the same based on the confusion analysis had West Coast registered all three
versions of “moviebuff.com” (including movie-buff.com and movie_buff.com).
220 See France, supra note 211.
221 Id.
222 See supra note 209 and accompanying text discussing concurrent primary uses. The
three conditions are: (1) a legitimate reason for selection of the domain; (2) involvement in
indirect competition with the hijacker or unaware of the hijackers existence; and (3) estab-
lishment of a web service prior to the hijacker’s date of filing for a federal trademark.
223 This rule presumes the defendant has actually launched the web site and the plain-
tiff has recently obtained the federal trademark registration.
224 See OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(using the “delta.com” example to demonstrate that domain-name guessing is not an exact
science).  It would be interesting to consider whether Delta Airlines, learning “delta.com”
was unavailable could then register “delta.net” and Delta Faucets, learning that
“delta.com” and “delta.net” were unavailable were able to register “delta.biz.” As new top
level domains are created to deal with the demand for domain-names, such problems are
inevitable, but these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. See Andy McCue,
COMPUTING, Nov. 24, 2000, Cybersquatters Target New Domain Names (visited Feb. 26,
2001) <http://www.vnunet.com/News/1114457> (warning that due to the approval of seven
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B. Search Engines & Meta Tags
Liability for meta tag infringement225 is not novel to Brook-
field.226  However, Brookfield’s failure to realistically analyze In-
ternet technology and use of “analogous” off-line infringement
situations seriously undermines its analysis of potential meta tag
infringement.  The traditional trademark law analysis ignored the
objective reality of Internet technology and use.  For example,
some search engines do not rely on meta tags.227  Furthermore,
Brookfield confounded the analysis of meta tag infringement by
creating suspect real world analogies.  Finally, the decision al-
lowed a “fair use” alternative. The court’s analysis fails on all
three counts.
1. Technically Inaccurate
The court presented two scenarios involving the use of In-
ternet search engines to discover the location of a web site in ex-
plaining meta tag infringement. The court focused in the first
scenario on West Coast’s use of “MovieBuff” in its meta tags, con-
cluding if West Coast’s domain-name were “westcoastvideo.com,”
then confusion was unlikely. The court explained in the second
scenario that West Coast’s use of “MovieBuff” or “moviebuff.com”
in its meta tags could result in potential consumer confusion.  The
confusion was presumed in the second scenario even if West Coast
were to use a domain-name other than “moviebuff.com,” such as
“westcoastvideo.com.”  The court stated that by using “movie
buff.com” in the site’s meta tags, visitors would be led to the site
under false pretenses.
a) Home Pages—“The Welcome Mat”
In the court’s first scenario, a web user at a search engine
entered what she was looking for and then the search engine pro-
duced a “list” of potential web sites which attempted to match the
search criteria.228  The court explained a “web user” in “scanning
new top level domains; .aero, .biz., .coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro, web entities will
have to come up with a domain-name strategy which goes beyond  “dot com” to combat a
potential new wave of cybersquatting).
225 The phrase “meta tag infringement” is used to describe the phenomenon of a web
site that has embedded in its meta tags the trademarks of another company in an effort to
increase visitors, divert traffic or other improper purposes.
226 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int’l, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. WL
724000, at *3 (E.D.Va. Apr. 10, 1998). An operator of an adult web site was found liable for
trademark infringement by using the marks “Playboy” and “Playmate” in its HTML code
(which would include the sites meta tags). Id.
227 See, e.g., Lastowka, supra note 52, at 847-48 (explaining that Yahoo relies on
human effort to categorize web page content, not automated programs which rely on meta
tags); Excite also claims to ignore keyword meta tags. Id. at 850 n. 74.
228 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999)
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the list . . .chooses” a site from the list produced.229  The act of
“scanning” demonstrates a web user must read the descriptions of
the results on the list and then make a decision as to which site
suits her needs.  In choosing a site, the user must “click” the
mouse on the result that appears the most relevant to her needs.
Web users do not blindly jump to web sites but actually read the
results of a search and then consciously select the destination that
looks most promising.
The court explained because a different domain-name,
“westcoastvideo.com” instead of “moviebuff.com” was used, a visi-
tor could confirm she was at the proper destination by not only
checking what the web address was, but also by looking at what
was displayed on the home page.  A visitor would not be confused
about whose site she had reached because she would see the home
page “prominently displays its own name” along with knowing the
web address matches this name.230
Problems exist with this example.  Initially, the court recog-
nized West Coast’s use of “moviebuff.com” was likely to confuse
visitors as to who actually sponsored the site.231 The court did not
discuss in this prior analysis what would be displayed on the
home page of West Coast’s site.232  Instead the court glossed over
exactly what it later stated to help validate this example, which is
that West Coast’s home page would prominently display West
Coast’s own name.233
In this example, the court discusses one of the most widely
understood components of the Web, the home page.  Yet the court
overlooked the primary purpose of a home page.  A home page is
the first page displayed when a visitor arrives at a web site.  It is
similar to the “welcome mat” in that it invites the visitor to enter
the site.  In welcoming the visitor to the site, a primary objective
of a home page is to clearly reveal the nature of the site and what
company sponsors the site.  Whether West Coast is using the do-
229 Id. (emphasis added).
230 The court provided no authority for its general presumption Web users generally
take note of the domain-name address when they arrive at a site.  The presumption ignores
four key observations.  First, the location/address bar on the web browser may be turned off
so the user cannot see it.  Second, when a person arrives at a page, the last place their eyes
are focused on is what the location/address bar reads.  Third, web site home pages do not
necessarily match domain-names (e.g., the domain-name “hollywoodandvine.com” is the
web address for the flagship web site of Capitol Records, not “www.capitolrecords.com”).
Fourth, the individual may have arrived via a link that does not mention the site name.
See Lastowka, supra note 52, at, 850 (explaining that although most search engine result
pages include the listed page’s title in the results, search engines vary greatly in what type
of additional information will be included on the result page, such as the web site address
of the listed page, the last day the page was indexed or the last day the page was updated).
231 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1057. “Web surfers are more likely to be confused as to
the ownership of a web site than traditional patrons of a brick-and-mortar store.” Id.
232 Id. at 1053-60.
233 Id. at 1062.
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main-name “moviebuff.com” or “westcoastvideo.com,” it will prom-
inently display its own name.  Nevertheless, Brookfield reasoned
by changing the domain-name, confusion as to sponsorship will
disappear.  Since West Coast would display its own name promi-
nently on its home page regardless of which domain-name was
used, the opinion over emphasized the importance of a domain-
name in its prior analysis.  In this later example, it minimized this
factor as practically nonexistent.234
Brookfield’s analysis ignored the fact when web users arrive
at West Coast’s home page, they will see the West Coast name and
realize it is not Brookfield’s despite what the browser’s address or
location bar states is the domain-name for the page.235  Further-
more, web browser options are customizable by users.  Any web
user has the ability to turn off the address bar or location bar fea-
ture in order to view more of the web page, and users with smaller
monitors and laptops quickly learn how to customize their web
browsers for such reasons.  The court therefore erroneously con-
cluded if West Coast were to use a domain-name other than
“moviebuff.com,” such a change would significantly reduce the
prior confusion regarding sponsorship of the site.
b) The Non-Pervasive Internet
In describing the second scenario, the court failed to under-
stand how search engines work.  The court explained: “Web surf-
ers looking for Brookfield’s ‘MovieBuff’ products who are taken by
a search engine to ‘westcoastvideo.com’ . . .will simply decide to
[use] West Coast’s offerings instead.”236  This statement is techni-
cally incorrect.  One cannot be “taken by a search engine” any-
where.  Interfacing with a search engine requires reading the
listed results and choosing the one that looks the most promising.
Unlike television and radio, the Internet is non-pervasive.237  It
does not transmit material to individuals at all times in all loca-
tions.  A person who wishes to access content on the Internet must
actively pursue it by getting connected, searching, reading, and
then physically “clicking” a mouse button on the applicable hyper-
link to retrieve the content.
234 Id.  The court states since West Coast’s home page “prominently displays its own
name, it is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has
reached,” id. (emphasis added).
235 Depending on which options a web user selects to be displayed from a web browsers
“view” menu; web browsers can display an “address bar” (for Internet Explorer or “location
bar” on Netscape Navigator) at the top of the screen, which will reveal the URL (uniform
resource locator) for the web page currently being viewed.  Included within this URL is the
domain-name for the web site (e.g., http://www.moviebuff.com/index.htm).
236 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (emphasis added).
237 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 875, 876 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining the
operation of a computer is not as simple as turning on a television and therefore the In-
ternet is not “uniquely pervasive”  like broadcast television and radio).
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The court stated in its first scenario that reading the results
is the way web users interact with search engines, when it ex-
plained a “list” of results is produced and by “scanning such list”,
web users would be able to find the web site they are “seeking.”238
If a web user is going to be “scanning” a list and “seeking” Brook-
field’s “MovieBuff,” then she will be searching for a result which
includes: “Home of Brookfield’s “MovieBuff” or “The Official Home
of Brookfield’s ‘Movie Buff.’ ”  The Web user is thus more likely to
avoid a site by West Coast even if it is returned on the search
results since it does not match the sought criteria.  The misunder-
standing of how search engines are utilized weakens the reason-
ing offered in the analysis.
c) Inconsistent Analysis
In the first meta tag scenario, the court explained West
Coast’s use of “MovieBuff” in meta tags would not likely lead to
confusion due to the domain-name being “www.westcoastvideo.
com” and the home page prominently displaying West Coast’s own
name.239  In the second scenario, the court explained that the use
of “www.moviebuff.com” in meta tags at West Coast’s “www.west
coastvideo.com” site would lead to initial interest confusion.240
However, West Coast would still be prominently displaying its
own name at this site regardless of whether West Coast uses
“MovieBuff” or “www.moviebuff.com” in its meta tags.
The court reasoned that the use of “moviebuff.com” or
“MovieBuff” in West Coast’s meta tags at its “westcoastvideo.com”
site would result in initial interest confusion apparently forgetting
that in the preceding paragraph it stated confusion as to sponsor-
ship would be unlikely where “MovieBuff” was used in the meta
tags.  The two scenarios proposed by the court are inconsistent
with each other.  The first one appeared to provide a situation
where it would be unlikely meta tag infringement would be action-
able.  The second scenario presented a situation where it appeared
such conduct would be improper.  By later stating that using
“MovieBuff” or “moviebuff.com” would be improper, it contradicted
its prior “MovieBuff” analysis of meta tag infringement where it
stated confusion was unlikely.
2. Initial Interest Confusion
“Initial interest confusion” is not recognized in all jurisdic-
tions. Brookfield adopts the rationale of courts finding “initial in-
238 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
239 Id.
240 Id.
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terest confusion” to be actionable under the Lanham Act.241
However, to create a cause of action for this practice under the
circumstances presented here is not only extending the right of
trademark owners to an unreasonable extent, but will create a sig-
nificant amount of litigation.  Other courts considering initial in-
terest confusion have correctly found such “brief confusion is not
cognizable under the trademark laws.”242
The reason initial interest confusion should not be actionable,
especially in the Internet context, is due to the brevity of the con-
fusion and the minimal inconvenience to the web user.  When a
web user arrives at a wrong destination, all she needs to do is
press the “back” button on her web browser and attempt a new
search.  As one court correctly observed, the harm is minimal:
“With one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a viewer can
return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for the
original website.”243  The Brookfield decision is suspect because it
appears unfamiliar with the Internet and the general experiences
occurring online.  In recognizing initial interest confusion online,
the court created too high an expectation for the Internet, de-
manding surfing the Web be a precise experience with exacting
results.  Although new Internet technologies such as cable
modems and digital subscriber lines (DSL) are making web surf-
ing easier and faster, the majority of users still rely on dial-up
modems,244 resulting in an often slow, frustrating process.  Arriv-
ing at the wrong destination is a common aspect of surfing the
Web.  True, it can be argued that in the aggregate all of the trips
back to a search engine to try again to find the sought-after desti-
nation results in a significant waste.  Search engines have a profit
motive to improve themselves and increase the accuracy of their
searches so as to offer their customers a better web experience.245
241 Id. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d
Cir. 1987); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404-05 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
242 See Teletech Customer Care Management (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp.
1407, 1410, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining the inconvenience experienced from initial
interest confusion online “is not substantial enough to be legally significant”).
243 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
244 See Sally Blodgett, Net Ratings Investor Relations (visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://
www.corporate-ir.net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=NTRT&script=411&layout=-
6&item_id=104297>. According to Nielsen//NetRatings data (the Internet audience mea-
surement service of Nielsen Media Research and NetRatings, Inc.), web users in the United
States primarily use modems to get online, id. A November 1999 survey revealed only 5.9
percent of home users were accessing the Internet via a high-speed connection (including
ISDN, T1 lines, satellite, cable modem, DSL), id. The majority of modem users access the
Internet using mid-speed modems providing access rates of 28.8/33.6Kbps, id.
245 See Lastowka, supra note 52, at 867. The author explains, “Search engines sell
their ability to find information on the Web, and the force of market competition requires
search engines to become better at what they do.  If search engines fail to perform the
search function effectively, users will not return,” id.
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Therefore, free market forces will respond to these temporary and
ever-changing shortcomings.
3. Unconvincing Analogy
The court supported its rationale for creating a cause of action
for initial interest confusion online by using a real world hypothet-
ical of a person driving a car in search of a video.246  The court
explained a driver pulls off the road because she is lured to a store
by the display of a competitor’s trademark.247  However, this ex-
ample is not analogous to having to merely click the “back” button
on a browser.  The real world of brick-and-mortar stores, traffic
signals, traffic jams, bumpy roads, noisy cars, fuel costs and re-
lated inconveniences are a poor analogy for the virtual confines of
cyber space and the relative ease with which one can surf the Web
with a few clicks of a mouse in the proverbial comfort of one’s
home.
The court, early in its opinion recognized, “[i]n the Internet
context, in particular, entering a web site takes little effort.”248
Leaving a web site similarly takes little effort.  One court critical
of the Brookfield metaphor explains, “Use of the highway billboard
metaphor is not the best analogy to a meta tag on the Internet.
The harm caused by a misleading billboard on the highway is dif-
ficult to correct.  In contrast, on the information superhighway,
resuming one’s search for the correct website is relatively sim-
ple.”249  A commentator cautions the use of off-line metaphors for
cyber disputes as in Brookfield’s billboard analogy “might be per-
suasive if meta tags were billboards, but unfortunately this is not
the case.”250
The court was concerned that permitting West Coast to use
“MovieBuff” would allow it to improperly benefit “from the good-
will that Brookfield developed in its mark.”251  However, where
two entities share a mutual connection to a term, which the public
can clearly distinguish off-line, then major confusion is unlikely.
Therefore, the question to ask is which party in Brookfield had
more goodwill associated with the term(s) “MovieBuff” in the on-
line world?  The court stated Brookfield’s “MovieBuff” mark was
246 See supra note 145 and accompanying text for a quote of the court’s analogy.
247 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)
248 Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).
249 Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
250 See Lastowka, supra note 52, at 857. The author’s solution to the temptation of
courts to reach for metaphors in an attempt to chart the unfamiliar Internet is to apply
more accurate and useful metaphors such as analogizing a search engine results page to a
thrift store discount bin filled with anything that vaguely is related to the meta tag
keyword, id. at 859-60.
251 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
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not only “weak”, but it also failed to present evidence of “the wide-
spread recognition of its mark.”252  On the other hand, West
Coast’s service mark would likely be considered strong with wide-
spread recognition.253  Because Brookfield’s mark was relatively
weak whereas West Coast’s was relatively strong, then web users,
who had learned that West Coast had a web site, would probably
attempt domain guessing with either “westcoast.com” or
“moviebuff.com.”  Therefore, Brookfield improperly benefits from
the goodwill West Coast had developed in its service mark.  When
the practice of space omission is considered, West Coast would
clearly have a larger visitor base seeking its site via
“moviebuff.com” than Brookfield.  Due to the general perception
that multi-term phrases off-line are viewed as single phrases on-
line, the goodwill usurpation analysis is similarly unconvincing.
4. Loopholes
After prohibiting use of another’s mark in one’s own meta
tags, the court suggested a fair use alternative that would produce
the same results as meta tag infringement. The court permitted
the use of “MovieBuff” on a West Coast web page in a comparative
advertising context.254  However, such use by West Coast could
have the same results the court is trying to prevent in addressing
meta tag infringement.  If the court is willing to permit West
Coast to place “Why pay for MovieBuff when you can get the same
thing here for FREE?” on the visible part of its web page, then in a
sense it is still authorizing a derivative version of meta tag
infringement.255
Considering how savvy some web masters can be, this reason-
able fair use alternative will soon be abused.  Web masters may
now start placing disclaimers and comparative fair use type ads
throughout their web pages just to permit the trademark terms
that appear in the phrases to be indexed by the search engines.256
For example an adult web site may display a disclaimer it is not
affiliated with “PLAYBOY” and further state throughout the page
252 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058.
253 Id. at 1042-43.  West Coast’s service mark, “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store,” was
registered with the PTO in 1991 and received incontestable status after five years of use,
id. West Coast claimed it has spent $15 million on advertisements and promotions featur-
ing the mark, id. at 1043 n.5. The court described West Coast as “one of the nation’s largest
video rental store chains with over 500 stores,” id. at 1042.
254 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066.
255 Id. at 1066.
256 See Lastowka, supra note 52, at 847-50.  Some mechanical search engines (e.g., Al-
taVista) utilize web indexing programs which continually search the Web, parsing and cat-
egorizing every web page reviewed based on the terms found in the meta tags or text of the
web page, id.
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it is better than “PLAYBOY.”  Some257 search engine programs do
not consider whether the site is or is not affiliated with Playboy
but instead place relevance on the number of times the term
“PLAYBOY” appears on the page or in the keyword meta tags.258
Search engines which factor in the number of instances of the
word “PLAYBOY” found on the web page will put this page higher
in the rankings of sites found when one does a search for “PLAY-
BOY.”259  For search engines relying on the frequency with which
a term appears on a page, the result would be the same as meta
tag infringement.
Fair use off-line has always granted a competitor the right to
use another’s mark in a comparative context.  However such off-
line use never had the hidden implications of search engines mon-
itoring the frequency of the use.  The court’s concern about meta
tag infringement therefore would not be alleviated, unless they
specifically limited Internet fair use to one or two mentions of a
competitor’s mark on the other party’s site.
The court’s decision extends trademark owners’ rights to new
heights, granting the trademark owner the ability to challenge
any competitor’s use of its mark in the competitors meta tags.
Such a far-reaching result overlooks the benefit a consumer may
receive by permitting such use.  One commentator, critical of
courts’ condemnation of commercial competitor use of trademarks
in meta tags noted that such use is unlikely to create any addi-
tional confusion, may present an opportunity for comparison shop-
ping, and is no different than off-line situations where retailers
often group similar competing products together.260
Brookfield did not reflect on the above considerations or any
benefit that may have been conferred on the public as a result of
West Coast’s use of “MovieBuff” in its meta tags.  A benefit, how-
ever, does exist.  West Coast was offering a similar product, a film
industry database, at a lower price—free of charge.261  In its ef-
forts to protect Brookfield’s mark from any potential infringing
257 An argument can be made that the best search engines would not be susceptible to
such abuse.  However, what is the “best” search engine online is relative considering some
web surfers will continue to use a potentially less sophisticated search engine out of sheer
habit.  Where even only a few of these inferior search engines are still susceptible to this
fair use abuse, Brookfield’s fair use alternative provides the aggrieved plaintiff with a less
than complete legal solution to its problem.
258 Id. at 849.  The methods search engines use to rank relevant sites vary widely, but
one of the primary factors is the number of times a search term appears on a web page, id.
259 Id. Although mechanical search engines are becoming more sophisticated and im-
plementing penalties for attempts to manipulate search engine results improperly, the
counter measures vary greatly in approach and effect, ranging from posting warnings such
practices are unacceptable to altogether abandoning use of the keyword meta tag, id. at
867 n.157, 868.
260 Id. at 876-77.
261 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
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use, Brookfield short-circuited any possibility that the Web may
have provided consumers with a free, viable option. However, in
trademark law, providing the consumer with a cheaper alterna-
tive is not a defense to infringement in trademark law.262
C. The Brookfield Remedy
The relief Brookfield received was a broad and immediate in-
junction against West Coast, effectively “pulling the plug” on West
Coast’s web site.263  West Coast was not given the opportunity to
place a “we’ve moved” notice on its site located at “moviebuff.com”
to redirect web traffic to its alternate site “westcoastvideo.com.”
1. Switchboard Relief
The term “cyberspace” does have one important truth; plenty
of room exists on the Internet.  As such, when a court adjudicates
a domain-name dispute, a reasonable remedy should consider this
reality.  A reasonable alternative in Brookfield would have been to
have a web page displayed at the “moviebuff.com” address, di-
recting Internet users to select between two different web sites:
Brookfield’s “moviebuffonline.com” or West Coast’s
“westcoastvideo.com.”  A person arriving at the page is presented
with a clear choice of clicking one of two links.264  One link would
lead to the online home of Brookfield’s “MovieBuff.”  The other
link would lead to the online home of West Coast Entertainment’s
“Movie Buff’s Movie Store.”  After a period of three to six months,
the majority of people should be able to adjust their “favorites”
and “bookmarks” to reflect the new locations of the web sites.  A
switchboard type relief would take up virtually no space on a web
server.265  The court could mandate the infringing party pay the
web programming charges for such relief.
An analogous relief was used in Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet En-
tertainment Group, Ltd.,266 where a court recognized the defen-
262 See Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, 974 F. Supp. 964, 978 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (explaining, just as good faith is no defense to a claim of infringement, it is similarly
no defense to trademark infringement that a defendant is merely presenting consumers
with what they demand—inexpensive or price discounted goods).
263 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043.
264 The switchboard relief scenario differs from the court’s analysis of search engine
result pages discussed previously because the switchboard page would be a special web
page with only two buttons.  Each button is clearly identified as being the route to either
Brookfield or West Coast.  This scenario would eliminate any potential confusion because
there are only two options on the page and the viewer can take the time to read the descrip-
tions of each site prior to selection.
265 A simple switchboard relief type web page with two simple buttons containing
hyperlinks would be small enough in file size to fit on a 3.5-inch 1.44-megabyte floppy disk.
Such a solution would pose no file storage concern with regards to the web server hosting
the web site’s web pages.
266 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1479  (W.D. Wash. 1996).
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dant’s equitable claim it had already committed significant sums
of money in advertising for an adult web site “candyland.com.”267
The court permitted the defendant to post a notice page at
“www.candyland.com” for approximately three months to give no-
tice to visitors the web site address had changed, but active links
to the new site were not allowed.268  Similar to the defendant in
Hasbro, West Coast claimed it had invested “considerable sums”
in building the web site.269
2. E-mail Efficiency
West Coast indicated to the court it was using
“@moviebuff.com” in e-mail correspondence.270  The court enjoined
West Coast from any further use of “@moviebuff.com,” foreclosing
a reasonable means for West Coast to inform customers and asso-
ciates the domain-name had changed.271  E-mail is virtually free,
practically instantaneous, and very efficient.  Because West Coast
was prohibited from using “@moviebuff.com,” it would have to re-
sort to other less efficient means such as mail, facsimile or tele-
phone to notify users that e-mail would no longer be available
from the “@moviebuff.com” domain.  An additional efficient and
relatively inexpensive resolution would have been e-mail aliases.
E-mail aliases could have been set up on servers presently hosting
“moviebuff.com.”  The aliases would automatically redirect all of
West Coast’s prior “@moviebuff.com” e-mail to
“@westcoastvideo.com” addresses with a simple redirect program.
3. Domain Purgatory
Who gets the domain?  The court did not decide the fate of
“moviebuff.com.”272  Where the infringer is a victim of reverse do-
main-name hijacking, courts should recommend a forced judicial
sale of the domain to the prevailing plaintiff. When a defendant
like West Coast is completely enjoined from any use of its domain-
name, the domain-name becomes worthless to the defendant, but
it still has value to the plaintiff.  The court could determine the
fair market value of the domain to effectuate this result.  Courts
should consider several factors in deciding the value of a domain-
name: current time left on the annual domain-name registration
fee; whether the defendant registered the domain-name in bad
267 See ROSENOER, supra note 62, at 106-107 (discussing Hasbro).
268 Id. In Hasbro the need for switchboard type relief was important because there was
the danger children may stumble upon the adult site and use of candyland.com was dilut-
ing a well-known trademark, id.
269 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
270 Id. at 1052.
271 Id. at 1043.
272 Id.
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faith; what values both parties place on the domain-name; length
of time the web site has been online and operational; what the
domain would potentially sell for at a domain-name brokerage
web site; and the amount of investment the defendant has reason-
ably made in developing and branding the site with the domain-
name.  This result will give the defendant a chance to recoup some
of its investment in the domain-name and prevent the domain
from being placed into cyber-limbo indefinitely.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Internet will continue to be of great importance in the
future. Brookfield adopted a traditional approach to handling a
domain-name dispute and reached a correct conclusion, but left
open a potential window that could create a significant amount of
litigation and create uncertainty for Internet entrepreneurs.
When considering meta tag infringement, the inquiry should be
fact specific, taking into consideration the technology at hand and
the typical practices of the web user.  Finally, as a new medium
which stands to revolutionize the way people conduct themselves,
people will make mistakes and controversies will arise, but unique
to this medium is the courts’ opportunity to foster growth and con-
fidence in it by fashioning remedies which are equitable and sup-
portive in nature instead of harsh and indifferent.
